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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF A FEDERAL
STATUTE: THE CASE OF VORNADO AIR
CIRCULATION SYSTEMS V. DURACRAFT
CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.1
Nowhere in the Constitution is it written that one federal
statute can preempt another federal statute. Such a proposi-
tion is absurd considering two underlying assumptions re-
garding such statutes and their enactment. First, is the as-
sumption that there is no inherent hierarchy of importance
among federal statutes. Second, is the assumption that Con-
gress does not intentionally pass conflicting laws.
The Tenth Circuit, in Vornado Air Circulation Systems v.
Duracraft Corp.,2 however, has implied through its holding,
that not only can there be a hierarchy among federal stat-
utes, but that one federal statute may preempt another fed-
eral statute. In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit held that a prod-
uct configuration which may be protected under the Lanham
Act 3 as a trade dress4 will be prevented from attaining fed-
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, c1. 2.
2. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995). Throughout the comment, I will refer to
this court as the "Vornado court," "appellate court," and the "Tenth Circuit"
interchangeably.
3. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), amended by the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-115, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581-83. The Lanham Act will
also be referred to as "federal trademark law" throughout the comment.
4. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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eral trademark protection by patent law, where the product is
a significant inventive aspect of a utility patented invention.5
This comment begins by defining and laying out the gen-
eral distinctions between patent and federal trademark law.6
Next, the inherent flaws behind the appellate court's ration-
ale in reaching its conclusion will be analyzed.7 The com-
ment then proposes that just as the Patent Act8 can take
something out of the public domain, the Lanham Act also
equally has this right.9 This comment also proposes that in
reviewing cases which contain both patent and trademark is-
sues, courts should disregard any relationship or overlapping
concerns and conflicts shared by the two federal statutes and
consider each patent or trademark issue separately. 10 Fi-
nally, this comment addresses the dangers of allowing a hier-
archy among federal statutes to develop, not only to the legal
community, but also to the public at large. 1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law
The United States patent laws provide a federal statu-
tory basis for protecting certain types of inventions for a lim-
ited period of time.12 The federal power to grant patent
rights arises from the U.S. Constitution, article I, section 8,
clause 8, which authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."'3 The type of protection given to
5. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510. The Vornado court held that:
[W]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility
patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive as-
pect of the invention, [citation] so that without it the invention could
not fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its
protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.
Id.
6. See infra part II.
7. See infra part III.
8. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part V.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (establishing the term of a utility patent to be 17
years); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1988) (establishing the term of a design patent to be 14
years); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY at 5-3 (3d. ed.
1995).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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an inventor of a patentable product is the "right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention through-
out the United States," 4 for the limited period of time pre-
scribed.15 In exchange for this protection, the inventor is re-
quired to fully disclose a description of the invention in the
patent application, 16 as set forth in 35 U.S.C. section 112.'"
An inventor seeking the protections afforded from a patent on
an invention must also meet further requirements, depend-
ing on the type of patent the inventor seeks to obtain.18
The United States Patent and Trademark Office identi-
fies two main types of patents, utility patents and design pat-
ents.' 9 Utility patents generally regulate the functional fea-
tures20 of inventions,2 whereas design patents "embrace the
visual characteristics displayed by an object and relate to
configuration, shape or surface ornamentation."2 2 An inven-
tion will be entitled to a utility patent if it falls within the
boundaries of 35 U.S.C. section 101,23 as well as meeting the
requirements of utility,24 novelty25 and nonobviousness. 26 An
invention will be entitled to a design patent if the design is
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
15. See supra note 12 (noting the length of patent protection).
16. See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5-24.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Section 112 of the patent statute states in perti-
nent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
18. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
19. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, at
§ 6.03[1] (3d ed. 1995) (identifying the two main types of patents as either util-
ity or design patents).
20. "In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."
Inwood Lab. v. Ives Lab., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). See also discussion
infra part II.D.
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (6th ed. 1990).
22. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5-23, 5-24.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The section provides: '"Whoever invents or dis-
covers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
24. See id.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
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new, original and ornamental. 27 A design which is primarily
functional as opposed to ornamental, can never be the subject
of a design patent.28
One of the principal goals of patent law is to encourage
and reward inventors, by promoting the disclosure of their in-
ventions in order to stimulate further innovation.29 In order
to further this goal, the framers of the United States Consti-
tution wanted to adopt a balance between free competition
and limited government-sponsored monopolies.3 ° Thomas
Jefferson at first opposed all forms of government-sponsored
monopolies, arguing that "an individual has no natural right
to an idea or invention,"13 ' but he eventually realized the so-
cial utility in rewarding inventors for their labors through
such monopolies. 32 James Madison also believed that inven-
tion was encouraged through the reward of government-spon-
sored monopolies.33 Unlike Jefferson, Madison argued that
an individual did have natural rights in inventions and
ideas.34 According to Madison, "the right to useful inventions
... belong[s] to the inventors. The public good fully coincides
... with the claims of individuals."3 5 Thus, the disclosure of
ideas required under patent law serves the purpose of in-
creasing and rewarding technological innovation.
B. Federal Trademark Law: The Lanham Act
Unlike patent law, which finds specific authority in the
Constitution,3 6 authority for the federal protection of trade-
27. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988).
28. See Payne Metal Enterprises, Ltd. v. McPhee, 382 F.2d 541, 546 (9th
Cir. 1967) (holding a design patent invalid because it described a device which
was determined to be functional). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5-24.
29. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Aronson v. Quick Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)).
30. See Anthony E. Dowell, Note, Trade Dress Protection of Product Design:
Stifling the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137, 149 (1994) (discussing Jefferson's opposition to all
forms of government sponsored monopolies).
31. Id.
32. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (discussing Jeffer-
son's support for limited monopolies).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
34. See Dowell, supra note 30, at 150 (discussing Madison's support for gov-
ernment sponsored monopolies).
35. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B. Wright
ed., 1961).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also supra text accompanying note 1.
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marks is indirectly taken from the "Commerce Clause."37
While one basic source of trademark protection is derived
from state common and statutory law, 8 the Lanham Act 39
"provides a system of federal registration for trademark
rights and for the administration of the system by the Patent
and Trademark Office"40 (hereinafter "P.T.O."). In order to
gain the protections of the Lanham Act, a product must be
inherently distinctive, nonfunctional and not likely to cause
customer confusion as to the source of the product. 41 In re-
turn, owners of a trademark are given "the right to use a par-
ticular mark and the right to exclude others from using the
same or similar mark in a manner that is likely to cause con-
fusion in the marketplace."42
Under common law, trademark rights may be acquired if
one first uses the mark in trade in a way that allows the con-
sumer to rely on it for its ultimate purpose.43 No registration
or other administrative process is necessary to acquire own-
ership rights.44 Federal law, however, provides that trade-
marks may be registered on the Lanham Act Principal Regis-
ter.45 Prior to registration on the Lanham Act Principal
Register, the owner of the mark must file an application with
the P.T.O. based on either existing ownership of the mark
46
or on the intent to use the mark in trade and interstate com-
merce, as well as meet various other requirements set forth
in 15 U.S.C. section 1051.4 7 Registration under the Lanham
Act provides additional rights and remedies beyond those
37. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among several States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7-8.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1988), amended by the Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581-83.
40. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7-8.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
42. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7-30; see also Homeowners Group Inc. v.
Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1991).
43. See generally PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGr, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED DOCTRINES, at 203-05 (revised 3d ed. 1993) (discussing requirements
for trademark protection).
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), (b) (1988)
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988).
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available under the common law.48 Among the benefits of
federal registration under the Lanham Act are "nationwide
protection of trademarks, access to the federal courts, and
constructive notice of trademark protection."49
Furthermore, the Lanham Act not only provides protec-
tion for federally registered marks under section 1114,50 but
it also provides protection for unregistered marks, as well as
the trade dress of a product under section 1125 (hereinafter
"section 43(a)"). 51 The trade dress of a product includes the
product's overall image or appearance.52 A trade dress will
only be protected if it is distinctive, 53 not likely to cause cus-
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1115-17 (1988).
49. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 7-8 to 7-9. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111,
1121, 1124 (1988).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Although § 43(a) does not specifically men-
tion "trade dress," federal courts have interpreted the language of that section
to protect trade dress. See, e.g., Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Vaughan Mfg.
Co. v. Brikam Intl, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 1987); Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812
F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
52. The scope of trade dress has been described as "the overall image used
to present it to purchasers; it could thus include, to give a partial list, the prod-
uct's size, shape, color, graphics, packaging, and label." Vaughan Mfg. Co., 814
F.2d at 348; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d
1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1992) (although individual aspects of trade dress may be
protected under trademark law in their own right, the entire look of a product
should be the focus in examining a trade dress).
53. See Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir.
1991) (jury instructions explained that "[d]istinctivenss is a term used to indi-
cate that a trade dress serves as a symbol of origin"). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrrIoN § 13, cmt. a (1993) ("a designation is distinctive
only if it functions as a symbol of identification"). See generally Jamison Dean
Newberg, The Same Old Enchilada? The Supreme Court Simplifies the Protec-
tion of Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 13 REV.
LITG. 299, 312-13 (1994) ("Distinctiveness can be established in two ways: by
proving that the trade dress is inherently distinctive or by showing that it has
acquired secondary meaning."). "Secondary meaning exists when in addition to
their literal, or dictionary, meaning, words connote to the public a product from
a unique source." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting Charcoal Steak
House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1964)).
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tomer confusion regarding the product's source, 54  and
nonfunctional. 55
Unlike patent law, which is designed to reward and pro-
mote inventions through disclosure of ideas in the market-
place in exchange for a limited monopoly, federal trademark
law focuses on preventing customers from being "confused,
misled, or deceived as to whose product they are buying. "56
Trademarks "foster competition and the maintenance of qual-
ity by securing to the producer the benefits of a good reputa-
tion."57 Trademark law thus benefits both the consumer and
manufacturer of a product. Consumers are able to rely on
trademarks to distinguish between competing products as
well as be assured of a certain level of quality in their
purchase. Manufacturers enjoy the right to "control the qual-
ity of the goods manufactured and sold under the
trademark."58
C. Cases Discussing Patent and Federal Trademark Law
as Providing Distinct and Separate Forms of
Protection
Several courts have held that generally, patents and
trademarks provide separate and different forms of protec-
tion59 and the absence or presence of one should not automat-
ically preclude protection under another. ° In In Re Mogen
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) ("Any person who.., uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.., which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act."). See
also Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1503 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("plaintiff must show that potential customers are likely to be con-
fused by the defendant's trade dress into thinking that the defendant is affili-
ated, connected or associated with the plaintiff or that the defendant's goods
originated with, or are sponsored or approved by the plaintiff').
55. A product must be nonfunctional if it is to be eligible for trade dress
protection. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt. d
(1993).
56. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508.
57. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
58. Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir.
1991).
59. Patents provide incentives to creators of useful or ornamental inven-
tions via the limited monopoly. See supra part II.A. Trademarks protect con-
sumers from confusion as to the source of a given product or service. See supra
part II.B.
60. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). See also In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
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David Wine Corp. ,61 the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals held that the existence of a design patent for the Mogen
David Wine Bottle did not preclude the right to register the
bottle shape as a trademark for the wine on the Lanham Act
Principal Register.62 One of the rationales behind the court's
conclusion is based on the premise that:
The underlying purpose and the essence of patent rights
are separate and distinct from those appertaining to
trademarks. No right accruing from the one is dependent
upon or conditioned by any right concomitant to the other.
The longevity of the exclusivity of one is limited by law
while the other may be extended in perpetuity. 3
Therefore, patent and trademark protection may coexist
within a single product 6 4 because each provides separate and
distinct forms of protection.
In Rolls-Royce Motors Limited v. A & A Fiberglass Incor-
porated, the deciding court held that patent and trademark
protection may coexist in a single product because they pro-
vide separate and distinct forms of protection.6 5 In Rolls-
Royce, plaintiff, Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd., contended that the
defendant's parts for radiator grill modification and hood or-
namentation, included in their automobile customizing kits,
were copies of similar parts installed on Rolls-Royce cars.66
The defendant argued that "to the extent that these parts are
functional, protection can be found only in the patent laws
and that, to the extent that they are nonfunctional, copyright
is the only safeguard."67 Furthermore, the defendant insisted
that "if these two parts are not functional, they are merely
ornamental and could be covered only by copyright or a de-
sign patent."68 The court, however, held that:
328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Honeywell Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A
Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
61. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
62. See supra text accompanying note 45.
63. Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d at 929.
64. The proposition that patent and trademark protection may coexist
within a single product is only applicable if the patent in question is a design
patent. See discussion infra part II.C. Utility patents may not be accorded
trademark protection based on the presumption that products with utility pat-
ents are functional. See discussion infra part II.D.
65. 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
66. Id. at 690.
67. Id. at 692.
68. Id.
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1996] FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL STAT. 261
There is no doubt that the plaintiffs Classic Grill and Fly-
ing Lady are attractive objects. As such, they may be de-
serving of copyright or design patent protection. Their en-
titlement to trademark recognition, however, depends not
on their eye appeal but on their characteristic of identify-
ing the manufacturer of Rolls-Royce motor cars.6
9
The court thus held that patent and trademark protection are
separate and distinct fields capable of coexistence and Rolls-
Royce was granted relief because the defendant's product
caused public confusion as to sponsorship of its kits.7 °
Lastly, in Truck Equipment Service Company v. Frue-
hauf Corporation, the Eighth Circuit also noted that patent
and trademark law were distinctive fields.71 In Fruehauf, the
sole issue before the court was whether Fruehauf's actions
constituted unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.72 The appellate court held that the defendant's acts
of using photographs of plaintiffs trailers in its sales litera-
ture and copying the exterior design of plaintiffs Cornhusker
800 in the manufacture of its own twin hopper bottomed
grain semi-trailer, constituted unfair competition under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.73 The court further noted that:
The protection accorded by the law of trademark and un-
fair competition is greater than that accorded by the law
of patents because each is directed at a different purpose.
The latter protects inventive activity which, after a term
of years, is dedicated to the public domain. The former
protects commercial activity which, in our society, is es-
sentially private.74
Therefore, the Fruehauf court also recognized the inherent
distinctions between patents and trademarks by focusing on
the different types of protections each provide.
69. Id. at 692-93.
70. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd., 428 F. Supp. at 699.
71. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
72. Id. at 1213.
73. Id. at 1213. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
74. Truck Equip. Serv. Co., 536 F.2d at 1215.
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D. Functionality Doctrine Solves Any Conflicts Between
Patent and Trademark Law
Any feature which serves a utilitarian purpose75 and af-
fords benefits not practically available through alternative
designs is functional.76 The functionality doctrine prevents
any conflict between trademark and utility patent law be-
cause it denies trademark protection to functional designs.7 7
Functional qualities of a product are not allowed trademark
protection for two reasons.7 8 First, the underlying purpose of
trademark law prevents functional features from being pro-
tected.79 A trademark is used "to identify the source of its
associated product or service to the public" and because of the
"assumption that functional features do not, and cannot per-
form this role, and that only arbitrary, non-functional sym-
bols can designate the producer," trademark protection may
not be given.80 Second, and more importantly, denying trade-
mark protection to functional features protects the integrity
of utility patents because it prevents manufacturers from
avoiding the stringent requirements for utility patent protec-
tion8 ' by claiming functional aspects of their products as
trademarks.82
75. Traditional definitions of functionality once consisted of only the utilita-
rian purposes of product features. See, e.g., Smith, Kline & French Labs. v.
Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725, 730-31 (3d. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 796
(1946); McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 21 Trademark Rep. 13, 16 (E.D.N.Y.
1930). See also Jay Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 938-39 (1988). ("The fundamental meaning of the word
'function' in the [functionality] doctrine's name is not merely any purpose, but a
useful or utilitarian purpose in the utility patent sense.").
76. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982) ("In general
terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."). See also Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A fea-
ture is functional if it is one that is costly to design around or do without, rather
than one that is costly to have.").
77. See McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 236 ("If there is to be legal protection
for functional features, such protection can only be gained by utility patent pro-
tection limited in time, not perpetual protection under trademark law.").
78. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What
Should be the Reach of Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671,
717 (1984).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18, 23-26.
82. Bauer, supra note 78, at 717.
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The requirement of non-functionality as a preclusion to
trademark protection is not statutory. Rather, the require-
ment of non-functionality is a judicial creation to further the
public policy of reconciling trademark and utility patent
law.83 The Third Circuit has ruled against trademark protec-
tion of functional features to prevent conflicts with patent
law.8 4 In Sylvania Electric Products Inc. v. Dura Electric
Lamp Company, 5 the court held that trademark protection
is not granted to functional features in order "to prevent the
grant of a perpetual monopoly by the issuance of a trademark
in the situation where a patent has either expired, or for one
reason or another, cannot be granted." 6 Similarly, in Keene
Corporation v. Paraflex Industries,s7 the Third Circuit held
that:
The purpose of the rule precluding trademark significance
[for functional features] is to prevent the grant of a per-
petual monopoly to features which cannot be patented
.... Products or features which have not qualified for pat-
ent protection but which are functional are in the public
domain and, are fair game for imitation and copying.8
8
Several other circuits have held that conflicts between the
Patent Act and the Lanham Act are eliminated by the func-
tionality doctrine.8 9
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has also re-
stricted registration of functional features as trademarks. In
Best Lock Corporation v. Schlage Lock Company,90 the court
stated that "[t]he reason is clear. If a configuration is func-
tional.., then everyone has the right to use the configuration
for its functional purpose, subject only to such exclusive right
83. Id. at 737 ("Thus the rationale behind the public policy requirement of
non-functionality is the need to accommodate trademark and unfair competi-
tion law with functional patent law.").
84. See Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Electric Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730
(3d Cir. 1957); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir.
1981); Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
85. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 247 F.2d at 730.
86. Id. at 732.
87. Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 824.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d
193 (2d Cir. 1981); Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co. 633 F.2d
912 (9th Cir. 1952); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir.
1980).
90. 413 F.2d 1195 (1969).
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for a limited time as may exist under the patent laws."91 In In
re Deister Concentrator Co., the court noted that "[a] feature
dictated solely by 'functional' (utilitarian) considerations may
not be protected as a trademark."92
The functionality doctrine not only prevents conflicts be-
tween trademark and patent law, but it also furthers a com-
mon goal addressed by both areas of the law - to foster com-
petition.93 The doctrine promotes competition by allowing
competitors to copy even distinctive features of a product
which indicate the product's source.94 Therefore, as stated by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Court in Deister,
"[a] certain amount of customer confusion may even be toler-
ated in order to give the public the advantages of free
competition." 95
E. The Main Case: Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.
v. Duracraft Corporation9 6
1. The Facts
The plaintiff, Vornado Air Circulation Systems (hereinaf-
ter "Vornado") in Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp.,9 started to sell its fans with spiral grills in
November 1988.98 On January 9, 1989, Vornado applied for a
utility patent on its ducted fan with a spiral grill, claiming
that "their spiral grill produced an optimum air flow,
although their own tests had shown that it performed about
the same as the more common straight radial grill, and later
tests suggested that some other grills worked better in some
respects."99 On May 22, 1990, Vornado was issued a utility
patent on the ducted fan.' 00 The spiral fan grill by itself was
not patentable because "a spiral grill per se was already in
91. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 236 (quoting Best Lock Corp., 413 F.2d at
1195). See also Dratler, supra note 75, at 945 ("Although originally and primar-
ily intended to protect the integrity of utility patent law .... The [functionality]
doctrine has assumed a related but much broader purpose: protecting competi-
tion in general.").
92. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
93. See McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 237-38.
94. See Dratler, supra note 75, at 887.
95. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d at 496.
96. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1500.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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the public domain as 'prior art,' a patent law term for what
was already known from previous patents or other
sources." 101 Vornado sold approximately 135,000 fans be-
tween January 1989 and August 1990.102
Duracraft Corporation (hereinafter "Duracraft"), in Au-
gust 1990, began selling an inexpensive electric household
fan called the Model DT-7 "Turbo Fan." 10 3 Duracraft's Turbo
Fan copied Vornado's more expensive fan models by incorpo-
rating in their fans the spiral vane structure grill.104
Duracraft's Turbo fan however, was purposefully designed
not to infringe Vornado's patent. 1 5 Nearly one million Turbo
Fans were sold in the United States by November 1992, mak-
ing the Turbo Fan Duracraft's second largest selling house-
hold fan product.1
0 6
Vornado sued Duracraft for intentionally copying its grill
design.10 7 Vornado argued that because the curved vanes in
their fans were legally nonfunctional, it was protected as a
trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.108 Both
Vornado and Duracraft agree that the Turbo Fan did not in-
fringe Vornado's patents.10 9
The district court granted Vornado an injunction but no
damages on its section 43(a) claim. 110 The court found that
Vornado's grill design was inherently distinctive, nonfunc-
tional and that "consumers were likely to be confused by
Duracraft's use of a similar grill.""' The court also held that
trade dress protection of nonfunctional product configura-
tions under the Lanham Act did not conflict with patent
law.112 Duracraft appealed to the Tenth Circuit, contending
that the district court committed legal error on several is-
sues. 1 3 The Tenth Circuit, however, only considered the is-
101. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1501.
105. Id.
106. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1502.
111. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1502.
112. Id. at 1501-02.
113. Id. at 1502.
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sue of whether Vornado's trade dress claim was barred by
federal patent law. 11
4
2. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the appellate court held that:
Where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim
in a utility patent, and the configuration is a described,
significant inventive aspect of the invention, so that with-
out it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same
invention, patent law prevents its protection as trade
dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.' 15
Furthermore, the appellate court held that "although a prod-
uct configuration must be nonfunctional in order to be pro-
tected as a trade dress under section 43(a),116 not every non-
functional configuration is eligible for that protection.1 1 7
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court first dis-
cussed several Supreme Court cases which were interpreted
to collectively manifest a "clear and continuing trend ... in
favor of the public's right to copy."118 Among the Supreme
Court Cases discussed was Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co. 19 According to the Vornado appellate court, the Kellogg
Company in Kellogg was allowed to copy National Biscuit
Company's pillow-shaped, shredded wheat cereal because the
invalidation of National Biscuit Company's design patent on
the cereal shape and expiration of its utility patents for the
machines to make the cereal shapes, created a public right to
copy the product. 120  The appellate court in Vornado inter-
preted the holding in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Man-
ufacturing Co.12 in a similar manner. 1 2 2 According to the
appellate court, the court in Singer allowed the defendant to
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1510.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
117. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500
(10th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 1505.
119. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
120. See id at 114; see also Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1504.
121. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
122. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1504. The appellate court, in its presentation of the
holdings in the Kellogg and Singer cases, implies that the invalidation and expi-
ration of patents creates a right to copy the products which were patented.
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copy Singer sewing machines because the expiration of their
patents created a public right to copy that product.
123
The appellate court then presented Supreme Court cases
which discussed the federal preemption of state statutes 124 in
support of its conclusion that the right to copy must prevail
when there is conflict between patent and trademark law. 125
Among the cases presented was Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif
fel Co. 126 In Sears, Stiffel Company's design and mechanical
patents covering the design and operation of a pole lamp were
invalidated. 127 The district court and the Seventh Circuit
both held that, under Illinois common law, the copying of
Stiffel's pole lamp by Sears constituted unfair competition be-
cause it was likely to cause customer confusion as to
source.' 28 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state
had no power to extend the life of a federal patent beyond its
expiration date or give protection to products that do not
qualify for federal patent protection.
129
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,1° Day-Brite
Lighting Company's design patent on a fluorescent light fix-
ture reflector with crossribs was held invalid. 131 Compco
Company was enjoined by the lower courts from making and
selling reflectors with a similar appearance to Day-Bright
Lighting Company's fluorescent light fixture, based on Illi-
nois unfair competition law. 132 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that although the reflector was nonfunctional, had
acquired secondary meaning, and was likely to cause cus-
tomer confusion as to source; no injunction against copying
123. See id.
124. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141 (1989);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
125. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1504 ("When asked to balance the concerns of pat-
ent law against those of unfair competition law with respect to the copying of
product shapes, the Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly over the years that the
right to copy must prevail.").
126. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 231 ("Just as a state cannot encroach upon federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair compe-
tition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal
patent laws.").
130. 376 U.S. 234, 234 (1964).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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may be granted as a result of potential policy conflicts with
patent law. 133
The appellate court interpreted the holdings in Sears and
Compco as the Supreme Court once again holding "that pat-
ent law's public domain concept must prevail over unfair
competition concerns about consumer confusion where those
concerns arose solely from the product copying." 13 4 The same
conclusion was also reached in the case of Bonito Boats Inc. v.
Thunder Craft.135 In Bonito Boats, a Florida statute prohibit-
ing the copying of boat hull designs by the direct molding pro-
cess, was held to be preempted by the patent laws.' 3 6 The
Bonito Boats court thus reaffirmed the central holding of
Sears/Compco, that "the efficient operation of the federal pat-
ent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly
known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions." 37
To add credence to its conclusion that patent law pre-
vents trade dress protection for a product configuration that
is part of a utility patent claim, 38 the appellate court dis-
missed the well established assumption that the functionality
doctrine eliminated any possible conflicts between the Lan-
ham Act and the Patent Act.' 39 To support the court's conclu-
sion that the functionality doctrine was ineffective in solving
the conflicts between the Patent and Lanham Act, the appel-
late court noted that "[d]espite what appears to be a wide-
spread perception that product configurations covered by util-
ity patents are automatically functional for Lanham Act
purposes, the district court in our case ably demonstrated
that this is not so. "14 ° The Vornado court then proceeded to
define functionality "in terms of competitive need."' 4 1 Fur-
thermore, the Vornado court concluded that "core patent
133. Id.
134. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1504
(10th Cir. 1995). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
135. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 156.
138. See Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
139. Id. at 1506 (listing cases that have supported that a nonfunctionality
requirement would eliminate any possible conflicts between the Lanham Act
and the Patent Act, and explaining how the district court's holding proved these
cases to be erroneous). See discussion infra parts II.D, III.C.
140. Id. at 1506.
141. Id. at 1507.
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principles will be significantly undermined if we do not allow
the copying in question, and peripheral Lanham Act protec-
tions will be denied if we do."142
In order to support its holding that "although a product
configuration must be nonfunctional in order to be protected
as trade dress under section 43(a),143 not every nonfunctional
configuration is eligible for that protection," 44 the appellate
court criticized the emphasis placed by the district court on
the Senate report accompanying the bill to expand section
43(a) in 1988.145 The appellate court concluded that the dis-
trict court "read too much into this report" and thus this court
"cannot conclude that because at the time of the report, cer-
tain nonfunctional configurations of goods' had received trade
dress protection, Congress was saying that in the future, all
such configurations should."
46
III. ANALYsIS
A. Vornado Court Erroneously Interpreted Cited Supreme
Court Cases
1. Expiration of Patents Do Not Create a Public Right
to Copy
The appellate court's discussion of the Supreme Court
cases of Kellogg and Singer erroneously implies that the expi-
ration of patent protection creates a public right to copy.
147
As one commentator has observed, "[s]ome judicial opinions
and legal writers have misconstrued the law by stating that
when patent rights expire, the mark of the patented article
will automatically fall into the public domain along with the
invention of the patent. However, this is not the law, and
never has been.' 48 Furthermore, it has been stated as early
as 1916 that "[t]here is no presumption of law, without proof
142. Id. at 1509.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
144. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500
(10th Cir. 1995).
145. Id. at 1506.
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23. See also Mine Safety Appli-
ances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
("Patent laws function only to keep things out of the public domain temporarily.
They have nothing to do with putting things into it. They say nothing about
right to copy or right to use, they speak only in terms of right to exclude.").
148. See McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 568.
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of the fact.., that a name used on a patented article passes
to the public domain."149
In reality, both the Kellogg and Singer courts denied
common law unfair competition protection15 ° not because the
expiration of a patent created a public right to copy, but
rather because the products in question did not qualify for
such protection. A product becoming generic' 5 ' and thus in-
capable of both common law and trademark protection, 52 is
in no way related to the expiration of a patent. As one com-
mentator noted, "[tihe fact that legal challenges usually arise
after the patents have expired, has misled some courts into
thinking that there is some causal relationship between pat-
ent expiration and the generic use of the alleged mark." 53
Rather, a product may have become generic during the life of
the patent and not as a result of patent expiration, as was the
case in Kellogg.15 1 In Kellogg, Justice Brandeis stated that:
Since during the life of the patents 'Shredded Wheat' was
the general designation of the patented product, there
passed to the public upon expiration of the patent, not
only the right to make the article as it was made during
149. Id. at 569 (quoting President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159
(2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 636 (1916)).
150. Requirements for protection under common law unfair competition and
federal trademark law are similar. Both require that the product at issue be
nonfunctional, distinctive and not likely to cause customer confusion as to the
source of a product. See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., 625
F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act is similar
to the New Jersey law of unfair competition); Park'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985) ("The protection of trademarks and trade dress under 43(a) serves the
statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition."); cf. Melissa
R. Gleiberman, Note: From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of
Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV.
2037, 2061 (1993) ("[It is important to remember that while section 43(a) is
found within the Lanham Act, it is still an unfair competition law.").
151. A generic designation is a term that denominates a general type or class
of goods, services, or businesses. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 14 cmt. a (1995).
152. Generic designations are not subject to appropriation as trademarks at
common law and are ineligible for registration under federal and state trade-
mark registration statutes. Id. See also Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (noting
that generic marks which are or have become the common descriptive name of
the product to which they refer, are never registrable as trademarks).
153. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 570. See also King-Seely Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting that plaintiffs mark
"Thermos" was no longer protected because it had become a generic name for
vacuum-insulated bottles).
154. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 571.
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the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto the
name by which it had become known. 
15 5
Therefore, phrases such as "'Shredded Wheat' was the gen-
eral designation of the patented product"1 6 and "the right to
apply thereto the name by which it had become known,"1 5 7
both indicate that the product had already become generic
during the life of the patent, and thus passed to the public
domain void of its distinctiveness. As one commentator
noted:
Thus "Shredded Wheat" had already become generic
before the patent ever expired. It is respectfully submit-
ted that Justice Brandeis confused cause and effect. Upon
expiration of patent rights, anyone was free to make bis-
cuits in that shape and with that machinery. But the
right to use the name "shredded wheat" had already
passed into the public domain because of public usage
even before anyone else could make this shape of biscuit.
It was merely because no one else could make this kind of
biscuit during the patent period that no other seller had
need to use "shredded wheat" as a generic term.1
58
Therefore, in Kellogg, protection under common law unfair
competition was not granted because the expiration of a pat-
ent created a public right to copy. Rather, protection under
common law unfair competition was not granted because the
product did not qualify for unfair competition protection since
it had become generic during the life of the patent.
Singer was another case cited by the Vornado court
which supports the proposition that a name does not become
generic because a patent has expired. In Singer, the court
noted:
[W]here, during the life of a monopoly created by a patent,
a name, whether it be arbitrary or be that of the inventor,
has become, by his consent, either express or tacit, the
identifying and generic name of the thing patented, this
name passes to the public with the cessation of the mo-
nopoly which the patent created .... "'
155. Id. (quoting Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 at 118
(1938)).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. See McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 570 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 169 (1896)).
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As one commentator observed:
Note that this does not state that the name became ge-
neric because the patents expired, but merely that if the
name had already become generic during the patented
"single source" period, then when others were free to copy
the public domain product, they of course, could use the
generic name. 16
0
Therefore, Kellogg and Singer, as cited by the Vornado court,
do not support that court's conclusion that patent expiration
on a particular product automatically places that product in
the public domain, free for all to copy.
The Kellogg and Singer cases also have no direct applica-
tion to the Vornado case because both are distinguishable.
Singer was distinguished by the Vornado court itself. As
stated by the court:
We also can distinguish Singer because it was decided at a
time when the tort of unfair competition was generally
perceived to require fraudulent passing off, and unfair
competition law has since evolved and expanded, so that
it may be violated without active deceit, wherever a prod-
uct shape has acquired secondary meaning and a likeli-
hood of consumer confusion is found.
161
The Vornado court's attempt to minimize the force of this dis-
tinction, by noting that "both the Supreme Court and our own
circuit have also preserved defendant's right to copy even
where defendants were found to have deliberately palmed off
their goods in an effort to deceive consumers," is insuffi-
cient.16 2 Regardless of what the Supreme Court or the Tenth
Circuit has ruled in the cases cited 16 3 to support the above
conclusion, none of the cases mentioned involve a conflict
with federal trademark law. Thus, the Vornado court's at-
tempt to find connections and similarities between the cases
it has cited and the Vornado case is futile.
Kellogg is distinguishable because in that case, no find-
ing of secondary meaning1 6 4 nor inherent distinctiveness was
160. Id.
161. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1505 n.
14 (10th Cir. 1995).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 n.14 (11th Cir.
1986) ("Secondary meaning is the connection in the consumer's mind between
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found. 165 In the Vornado case, the district court found inher-
ent distinctiveness. 166 Furthermore, the Kellogg court, in ex-
plaining why copying of the goods in the same pillow-shape
was permitted, stated that "[t]he evidence is persuasive that
this form is functional - that the cost of the biscuit would be
increased and its high quality lessened if some other form
were substituted for the pillow-shape."' 67
In the Vornado case, the district court explicitly stated
that the spiral grill was nonfunctional and that "other feasi-
ble grill structures could easily do as well on other relevant
performance tests, and the spiral grill was not shown to be
cheaper to manufacture."168 Therefore, not only was the
product in Kellogg generic, but it also did not meet the re-
quirements of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality which are
crucial to protection under common law unfair competion
16 9
and federal trademark law. 170 The shape of the biscuit could
not be protected without resort to the policies of patent law.
The spiral grill in the Vornado court, however, did meet all of
the requirements needed to attain trademark protection.
Thus, the Vornado court was erroneous in not allowing fed-
eral trademark protection to the spiral grill.
2. Federal Preemption Cases Cited Not Applicable to
the Vornado Case
The Supreme Court preemption cases cited by the Vor-
nado court, namely Sears, Compco and Bonito Boats, all dealt
with federal preemption of state unfair competition stat-
utes. 17 1 No Lanham Act issue was raised. Therefore, be-
cause the three Supreme Court cases were strictly based on
the mark and the product's producer, whether the producer is known or
unknown.").
165. See Kellogg v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (noting that no
inherent distinctiveness was found because the shape of the biscuit was "pri-
marily associated with the article rather than the particular producer"). See
also Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1505.
166. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1502 ("The court further found the grill design was
a suggestive symbol combined with a device, and thus inherently distinctive, so
that no showing of secondary meaning was required.").
167. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
168. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
169. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 125-37.
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the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 172 and because fed-
eral trademark law is not subject to preemption by the
supremacy clause, 173 the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of
cases is not applicable to the Vornado case.
Federal trademark law is not subject to preemption by
another federal statute. Therefore, to the extent that a plain-
tiff can convert a state unfair competition case into a federal
case by invoking the Lanham Act, the preemptive thrust of
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases can be avoided. For
example, the Eighth Circuit has taken the position that sec-
tion 43(a)1 74 was not preempted by Sears and Compco in
Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corporation.175 In
that case, defendant's contention that it was privileged to
copy the exterior design of the plaintiffs product based on
Sears/Compco was denied by the court.' 7 6 According to the
Fruehauf court, "[n]either case is controlling here .... The
issue before the Court (Sears/Compco Courts) was whether
state law could extend the effective term of patent protection
granted by federal statutes. The focus of the Court was the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."177
Other circuits have adopted the Eighth Circuit's view
that Sears/Compco has no effect on the Lanham Act. For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit in Ives Laboratories Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co.,17 stated that:
It is surely true that in the Sears and Compco opinions
the Supreme Court said nothing about the federal tort
created by section 43(a) .... The Court, it can be strongly
argued, had no need to be concerned with marking out the
172. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also discussion infra parts I.A, IV.
173. By definition, preemption means that state law protection ceases when
it is inconsistent with a federal interest and a federal regulatory regime.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1117 (6th ed., 1990). The Lanham Act is not a state
statutory regime but rather a federal statute; therefore, it may not be pre-
empted by the Supremacy Clause. Cf. Preston State Bank v. Ainsworth, 552 F.
Supp. 578, 580 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (discussing how the Lanham Act section 43(a)
should not be preempted by the National Banking Act as "two federal laws ap-
plicable to the same situation should be applied harmoniously").
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
175. 536 F.2d 1210, 1210 (8th Cir. 1975); see, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); see also dis-
cussion infra part II.C.
176. Truck Equip., 536 F.2d at 1214.
177. Id.
178. 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds 638 F.2d
538 (2d Cir. 1981).
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boundaries of a federal tort over which it had complete
control and which Congress could contract if the courts
were pressing it further than that body desired.
17 9
The Third Circuit has also agreed that a "[s]uit brought
under section 43(a) survives the stringent limitations on
state unfair competition laws imposed by the decisions of the
Supreme Court [in Sears-Compco].' u s°
Furthermore, the Compco decision itself stated that "[i]f
the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal
statutory protection, then it can be copied at will."181 Bonito
Boats also noted that by enacting section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, "Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of
the concerns which underlie the state tort of unfair competi-
tion and the application of Sears and Compco to nonfunc-
tional aspects of a product which have been shown to identify
source must take account of competing federal policies in this
regard. " 1 2 This passage thus indicates that the Supreme
Court fully recognizes that the preemption rationale of Sears!
Compco has no relevance to the use of Lanham Act section
43(a) as a means of asserting a federal claim against product
copying.
B. The Vornado Court Erroneously Concluded that the
Functionality Doctrine Provided an Incomplete
Answer to the Conflicts Between the Patent Act
and the Lanham Act
The proposition that the functionality doctrine elimi-
nates conflicts between the Patent Act and the Lanham Act
has been widely accepted by various courts and commenta-
tors.183 The Vornado court attempted to dispel this widely
accepted proposition by erroneously concluding that all prod-
uct configurations or product parts must be functional before
a utility patent may be issued.18 4 The Vornado court also at-
179. Id. at 642.
180. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc, 653 F.2d 822 (3d. Cir. 1981); see,
e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Corp. 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982); SK&F Co.,
625 F.2d at 1064-65.
181. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (emphasis
added).
182. Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989).
183. See discussion infra part II.D.
184. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506-07
(10th Cir. 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes 186-89.
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tempted to dispel the widely held proposition that functional
features eliminate conflicts between the Patent Act and the
Lanham Act, by overemphasizing an incomplete definition of
functionality. 18 5
The Vornado court concluded that "[d]espite what ap-
pears to be a widespread perception that product configura-
tions covered by utility patents are automatically functional
for Lanham Act purposes, the district court in our case ably
demonstrated that this is not so." 8 6 The appellate court's
conclusion was erroneous because not all separate product
configurations of a given product must be functional before a
utility patent will issue. Rather, functionality is determined
by looking at the entire product as a whole. This is evidenced
by the fact that the P.T.O. granted Vornado a utility patent
on their ducted fans, despite the fact that the fan's spiral grill
was not in and of itself, capable of being patented. In fact, as
noted by the court, "[i]ts fan grill was not patentable by itself
because a spiral grill per se was already in the public domain
as 'prior art,' a patent law term for what was already known
from previous other patents or other sources."187
Furthermore, the district court held that the spiral grill
was nonfunctional in a legal sense1 8 and that "other feasible
grill structures could easily do as well on other relevant per-
formance tests and the spiral grill was not shown to be
cheaper to manufacture." 8 9 Therefore, the appellate court's
conclusion that the district court disproved a "widespread
perception that product configurations covered by utility pat-
ents are automatically functional for Lanham Act purposes"
was clearly erroneous. 90 The district court granted protec-
tion to a product which met all the necessary requirements
for federal trademark protection. The fan grill was inher-
185. The definition of functionality adopted by the Vornado court was "in
terms of competitive need." Id. at 1507. See also supra text accompanying
notes 138-42.
186. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1506.
187. Id. at 1500.
188. Id. at 1501 ("The district court found that the spiral grill was functional
in a lay sense but not in a legal sense.").
189. Id.; see also discussion infra part II.D (discussion supports quote as a
definition of functionality).
190. Id. at 1506.
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ently distinctive, not likely to cause customer confusion as to
source and nonfunctional.
191
The Vornado court also attempted to dispel the widely
held proposition that functional features eliminate conflicts
between the Patent Act and the Lanham Act, by overempha-
sizing an incomplete definition of functionality.192 The Vor-
nado court defined functionality exclusively based "in terms
of competitive need."' 93 By exclusively using this definition
of functionality, the Vornado court then argued that a prod-
uct did not have to be functional in order to meet the require-
ments of patent protection. 194 Such a conclusion is erroneous
because defining functionality exclusively "in terms of com-
petitive need" does not do justice to its true definition or what
most courts have interpreted functionality to mean.'95
By definition, any feature which serves a utilitarian pur-
pose and affords benefits not practically available through al-
ternative designs is functional.196  As one commentator
wrote:
[T]he fundamental meaning of the word 'function' in the
doctrine's name is not merely any purpose, but a useful or
utilitarian purpose in the utility patent sense. If a feature
of an article is dictated by such a useful purpose, it is
191. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc, 653 F.2d 822 (3d. Cir. 1981); see
also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
193. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1507 (noting that to define functionality "in terms
of competitive need" means that "if competitors need to be able to use a particu-
lar configuration in order to make an equally competitive product, it is func-
tional, but if they do not, it may be nonfunctional").
194. The Vornado court argues that:
to meet patent law's usefulness requirement, a product need not be
better than other alternatives or essential to competition ... an inven-
tor need only show that an invention is 1) useful in the sense of deriv-
ing some identified, beneficial purpose, and then-much more difficult
to prove-that it is 2) novel, i.e. not previously known, and 3) nonobvi-
ous, or sufficiently inventive, in light of prior art.
Id. at 1506-07.
195. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc, 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d. Cir. 1981)
(noting that design is not functional when it "is not significantly related to the
utilitarian function of the product, but is merely arbitrary"). Traditional defini-
tions of functionality embraced only utilitarian purposes of product features.
See, e.g., Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725, 730-31
(3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 796 (1946); McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg.
Co., 21 Trademark Rep. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).
196. See discussion infra part II.D.
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functional and must be protected, if at all, by a utility
patent. 197
This "utilitarian" definition of functionality is thus consistent
with the requirements of patent law's requirement that an
invention be "useful, in the sense of serving some identified,
beneficial purpose."'98 Thus, the "in terms of competition"
definition of functionality that the appellate court used in its
analysis was incomplete.
The appellate court's conclusion that the functionality
doctrine provides an incomplete answer to conflicts regarding
the Patent Act and the Lanham Act was thus erroneous. Not
all parts of a product must be functional before the entire
product is accorded a utility patent. Therefore, there is no
conflict between the P.T.O.'s patent protection of the ducted
fan (which for Lanham Act purposes is functional) and the
district court's holding that the fan grill was nonfunctional.
Furthermore, a complete definition of functionality which in-
cludes the "utilitarian" component is sufficiently consistent
with, and meets, patent law's requirement that an invention
be useful.
C. The Vornado Court does not do Justice to Federal
Trademark Law
The Vornado court's analysis and conclusions regarding
its attempts to reconcile the two federal statutes do not do
justice to federal trademark law. First, the appellate court
concludes that allowing an inventor both patent and trade
dress protection in a configuration would indirectly inhibit in-
ventors, because by allowing a "double benefit... the inven-
tor's supply of ideas itself and freedom to experiment with
them might diminish if the inventor had to do a competitive
market analysis before adopting useful features from others'
inventions once their patents expired." 199 Such a conjecture
is not only unfounded but unjustly implies a double standard
regarding the Patent Act and the Lanham Act.
The standard implied by the Vornado court is that only
patent law may freely take a concept or product out of the
public domain. This double standard is further emphasized
in the court's analysis regarding the effect that trade dress
197. Dratler, supra note 75, at 942.
198. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 58 F.3d 1498,1507 (10th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 1508.
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protection would have regarding the patent law goal of en-
couraging public disclosure of ideas. The court concluded
that "this case clearly shows that trade dress protection can
directly interfere with the public's ability to practice patented
inventions after the patents have expired, and that it under-
mines the principle that ideas in the public domain should
stay there."2 ° °
Such a conclusion is erroneous for two reasons. First,
there is no widely held principle that "ideas in the public do-
main should stay there."20 1 This is evidenced by the fact that
federal trademark, copyright and patent law, as well as other
common law intellectual property protections, take products
and ideas in and out of the public domain all the time.20 2 Sec-
ond, such a conclusion implies that patent law may take
something out of the public domain. However, if a product is
taken away from the public domain to further the goals and
objectives of the Lanham Act, it is wrong or somehow hurting
society. Such an implication is clearly erroneous because the
very purpose of the Lanham Act is to benefit the public by
preventing it from being confused as to the source of the prod-
ucts purchased.20 3 Lastly, the court misinterpreted the un-
derlying goals of the Lanham Act by concluding that "protect-
ing against that degree of confusion that may arise from such
configurations that are significant parts of patented inven-
tions is, at best, a peripheral concern of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act."20 4
The primary, if not only, concern of the Lanham Act is to
prevent customer confusion as to source regarding any prod-
uct.20 5 Whether or not a product is a normal everyday prod-
uct or "a significant part of patented inventions" is unimpor-
200. Id.
201. See MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at 149 (comparison of patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights reveal that all three may take things in and out of the
public domain for specified periods of time and thus the statement that "ideas
in the public domain should stay there" is erroneous).
202. Id. (Federal trademark protection lasts as long as the product or service
is distinctive, nonfunctional and not likely to cause consumer confusion as to
the source of the product. Utility patent protection is 17 years and design pat-
ent protection lasts for 14 years. Copyright protection for works created after
January 1, 1978 is the life of the author plus 50 years.)
203. See supra text accompanying note 56.
204. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1509
(10th Cir. 1995).
205. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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tant. If that product can meet the requirements of
distinctiveness, not likely to cause customer confusion as to
the product's source and nonfunctionality, it may be pro-
tected by the Lanham Act.2 °6 Therefore, the court's conclu-
sion that "core patent principles will be significantly under-
mined if we do not allow the copying in question, and
peripheral Lanham Act protections will be denied if we
do,"207 is without merit.
The Vornado court's conclusion-that not every nonfunc-
tional configuration is eligible for trade dress protection-is
erroneous.208 The court's rationale for this view relies on the
Senate report accompanying the bill to expand section 43(a)
in 1988, from which the court infers a Congressional intent to
allow all nonfunctional configurations trade dress protection.
However, that assumption does not support the result the
court reaches. As discussed above, there is no reason not to
allow trademark protection if the necessary requirements for
protection are met. Even if the Senate report did not imply
that all nonfunctional configurations should be given trade
dress protection, it is still silent regarding the eligibility of
the product configuration to attain trade dress protection. As
long as the product is nonfunctional and it meets the other
requirements for federal trademark protection of being dis-
tinctive and not likely to cause customer confusion as to
source, the product should always be eligible for Lanham Act
protection.
IV. PROPOSAL
This comment disagrees with the decision in Vornado,
that patent law has the power to deny Lanham Act protection
to products or services, regardless of whether or not such
products meet the Lanham Act requirements for protection.
Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act were enacted to fur-
ther different goals and purposes. 20 9 The two federal statutes
are separate and distinct.210 To the extent that patent and
206. See supra text accompanying note 42.
207. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1509.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 56.
210. See discussion supra part II.C.
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federal trademark law do conflict, it has been established
that the functionality doctrine reconciles these concerns.2 11
This comment proposes that federal trademark law has
just as much right to take something out of the public domain
as patent law. In reviewing cases which contain both patent
and trademark issues, courts should thus disregard any rela-
tionships or overlapping concerns and conflicts shared by the
federal statutes. Courts should isolate each patent or trade-
mark issue and analyze the issue of whether or not to allow
patent or trademark protection separately. If the require-
ments for patent or trademark protection are met, then the
product should be given such protection, regardless of
whether or not the product is already being protected by an-
other federal statute.
This type of standard for review should be applied by the
courts for two reasons. First, deciding patent and trademark
issues with an eye towards ensuring that the goals of each
are not offended in any way, is a futile task. It is inevitable
that furthering the goals of one can almost always be inter-
preted as offending the goals of the other. Therefore, because
an argument can always be made that the goals of one will
hinder the effective furtherance of the objectives of the other,
courts should strictly focus on these two separate and distinct
statutes independently. It is only through this strict analysis
that the goals of each will truly be furthered.
Furthermore, nowhere is it written that Congress in-
tended the courts to read patent and trademark legislation
with a cautionary eye to ensure that neither steps on the toes
of the other. The congressional hearings and reports in no
way mention the Patent Act in its discussion of the Lanham
Act and vice versa. Rather, Congress had clear and separate
objectives in enacting the Patent Act and the Lanham Act.
The Patent Act was enacted to reward and promote inven-
tions via the disclosure of ideas in the marketplace in ex-
change for a limited monopoly. 212 The Lanham Act was en-
acted to prevent customers from being confused, misled or
deceived regarding a product's source.213 In light of the dis-
tinct and separate goals of the Patent Act and the Lanham
211. See discussion supra part II.D.
212. See supra part II.A.
213. See supra part II.B.
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Act, courts should thus interpret the two statutes independ-
ent of each other.
Second, this strict standard of review should be applied
because the very notion of one federal statute preempting an-
other federal statute is unfounded and unconstitutional.
Federal statutes may preempt state statutes via the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 214  The Supreme
Court has invoked the Supremacy Clause by allowing the
Patent Act to preempt several common law unfair competi-
tion statutes, exemplified by Sears, Compco and Bonito
Boats.21 5 Similarly, the Lanham Act has also preempted
state unfair competition statutes where state trademark law
has conflicted with the rights and remedies under federal
law.21 6 The equality of the two federal statutes is thus inher-
ent and the notion that one federal statute may preempt an-
other is absurd. Strict and separate application of the Patent
Act and the Lanham Act will circumvent this problem and
should thus be used by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Vornado court erroneously suggested that the goals
of patent law are superior to the goals of trademark law.
Such a conclusion is not only unsupported by case law or stat-
ute, but it is also unconstitutional. No hierarchy exists
among two federal statutes, which would allow for one fed-
eral statute to preempt another federal statute. Congress
does not make it a policy of potentially creating anarchy by
passing conflicting laws.
The Vornado court's holding that one federal statute may
preempt another federal statue is not only unfounded, but
will have adverse effects not only within the legal community,
but also within the public at large. Attorneys and judges
would not be able to rely on federal statutes if a statute can
be held invalid upon a showing that the goals of another to-
214. U.S. CONST. art. IV. See also supra text accompanying note 1.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 124-37.
216. See Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th
Cir. 1969) (Ninth Circuit struck down a California statute awarding ownership
of a trademark to a remote prior out-of-state user because it conflicted with the
scheme of 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act. See also Jaycees v. Commodities Maga-
zine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1367-68 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (Lanham Act preempts
operation of IOWA CODE § 548.11.2 as applied to federally registered
trademarks).
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tally separate and distinct federal statute may be marginally
affected. Society would suffer because justice would no longer
be based purely on reliance of the law, if laws were able to be
proven unworkable, based on peripheral concerns, in light of
other laws of equal importance.
These adverse effects can be avoided if courts interpret
each federal statute such as the Patent Act and the Lanham
Act in a vacuum, especially absent any congressional intent
to the contrary. The Patent Act and the Lanham Act both
further different goals and objectives and courts should en-
sure the furtherance of each if the respective requirements of
each statute are met. The Vornado court's holding was
clearly erroneous. The spiral grill met the requirements of
federal trademark protection. The district court's holding to
allow the spiral grill to be protected as a trade dress under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, should have been upheld.
Two coequal federal statutes should never be allowed to pre-
empt one another.
Ruby Ann David

